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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The jury unanimously found that plaintiff/appellant
James Sanders (plaintiff or Sanders) did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his injuries, if any, were proximately caused by the automobile accident between him and
defendant/respondant, Kristin Ahlstrom (defendant or Ahlstrom).
The trial court entered judgment on the jury's special verdict
and denied plaintiff's motion for new trial.

The issue is

whether or not the jury verdict should be set aside and whether
or not the judgment of the trial court should be vacated and the
case remanded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This personal injury action arose from an automobile
accident.

The case was tried by jury before the Honorable

Leonard H. Russon, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court.
The jury found that defendant was negligent and that her negligence caused the accident.

However, the jury unanimously

answered interrogatory 3 on the Special Verdict as follows:
3. If you answered questions 1 and 2
"Yes11, then answer this question: Did
James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that his injuries, if any,
were proximately caused by the accident in
question?
ANSWER:

No.

A copy of the signed special verdict is appended hereto as
Appendix 1.
The trial court entered judgment on the special verdict

-1-

in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, no cause of action.
(Appendix 2 herein)

Plaintiff made a motion for new trial which

was briefed, argued and then denied by the court.

(Appendix 3

herein)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because plaintiff's Statement of Facts is incomplete,
misleading, conclusionary and in many instances without proper
support in the record, it is necessary for defendant to discuss
in some detail the facts of this case.
On September 25, 1982, plaintiff was driving an automobile in which several other members of his family were
passengers.
red light.

(R. 351)
(R. 25)

His automobile was last in line behind

several other cars.
slick.

At the base of a hill he stopped for a

(R. 25)

The roads were very wet and very

(R. 648, 649)
Shortly after plaintiff stopped, defendant driving a car

in which her four children were passengers crested the hill, saw
the red light and line of cars behind it and applied her brakes.
(R. 648) Defendant's car slid on the wet roads, did not slow as
quickly as it would have under normal conditions, and collided
with the rear of plaintiff's vehicle.

(R. 649)

Plaintiff

testified that he was stopped within a car length of the car in
front of him and that the impact knocked his car forward two or
three feet.

(R. 429, 513) The impact did not push plaintiff's

car into the car in front of it.

Damage to plaintiff and defendant's vehicles was minor
as shown by the photographs taken of the vehicles shortly after
the collision.

(Exhibits 2-P, 30-D)

The investigating officer

estimated the impact speed at 15 miles per hour.

(R. 625)

David

Lord, an accident reconstructionist called by plaintiff, agreed
with the investigating officer's assessment of impact speed.
387)

(R.

However, Mr. Lord admitted that assuming an impact of 15

miles an hour and further assuming that plaintiff's foot remained
firmly on the brake after impact, plaintiff's car would have been
pushed forward a full 18 feet from the point of impact until it
came to rest.

(R. 415, 416)

After the accident while plaintiff's son directed traffic, defendant had some conversations at the scene of the accident which she related as follows:
A. Right after the accident, I quickly
made sure all of my children wre okay and
they all were. I got out of my car. I
went down and went to the passenger side
of Mr. Sanders car to ask them if they
were all right. The baby was crying a lot
and I was concerned maybe he was hurt and
I asked the mother several times. I said,
"Is the baby okay?" And she said, "Yes,
he is fine. It just scared him." I asked
her that several times. She seemed to
indicate everybody was all right.
Q. After that occurred, did you have
any conversations with Mr. Sanders?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you relate those conversations,
please?
A. He told me that he thought he might
have a whiplash because he had had one
once before. (R. 651, 652)
-V

At the scene of the accident, Todd Ahlstrom, defendant's
oldest son, heard his mother state that plaintiff told her that
he (plaintiff) had experienced a prior whiplash.

(R. 725)

A few

minutes after the accident, defendant drove to her mother's house
where she related the conversation she had with plaintiff at the
scene when plaintiff admitted he had experienced a prior
whiplash.

(R. 653)

The investigating officer, Jerry Peterson,

had a memory of a statement being made by someone at the intersection in question following an accident to the effect, "I had a
prior whiplash."

(R. 626, 627)

Contrary to the above testimony, plaintiff denied
telling defendant at the scene that he had experienced a prior
whiplash.

(R. 30)

However, he admitted that he was involved in

two rearend collisions before September 25, 1982, but he failed
to give much detail regarding these accidents.

He said he could

not recall exactly when the accidents occurred except that both
of them occurred during the summer of 1982, nor could he recall
who the involved parties were.

(R. 510)

Regarding the rearend accident immediately preceding the
September 25, 1982 accident between Sanders and Ahlstrom, Sanders
admitted that after this prior accident occurred, his neck was
sore, stiff and hurt for two, three or four days.

(R. 435, 436)

Plaintiff was involved in a subsequent accident in July
of 1983, when a car which was speeding, smashed into the side of
a Fiat vehicle in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger.
490-492)

(R.

Dr. Goka testified plaintiff was injured in this acci-

dent.

(R. 587, 592, 597)

When pressed on cross-examination,

plaintiff admitted he was injured "to a degree."
Plaintiff's wife admitted he "was hurting."

(R. 491)

(R. 619)

After the September 25, 1982 accident was investigated
by Officer Peterson, plaintiff and his family continued on with
their family outing.

They went to the Stuffed Noodle Restaurant,

had lunch together and then returned home.

(R. 485)

Plaintiff did not see a doctor immediately.

Plaintiff

testified that his first medical treatment was in the form of
therapy from Burt Kidman who plaintiff identified as a chiropractor, osteopath and masseuse.

(R. 485)

Plaintiff testified that

he had seen Mr. Kidman repeatedly in the past for back problems
including kinks in his back and neck.

(R. 485, 486)

According

to plaintiff, after his initial visit with Mr. Kidman on
September 27, 1985, he saw Kidman several times thereafter.
However, plaintiff did not call Mr. Kidman to testify nor did he
introduce as exhibits any records which may have been maintained
by Kidman.
Plaintiff testified that after undergoing massage treatments at the hands of Burt Kidman, he was seen by his brother-inlaw, Dr. Evans, then a radiologist, a Dr. Winters, who took some
x-rays and finally Dr. Rich, a neurologist.

(R. 442)

Plaintiff

chose not to call Dr. Evans, Dr. Winters and Dr. Rich and chose
not to introduce any of their medical records. However, Dr.
Barbuto and Dr. Spencer reviewed records from these doctors which
assisted them in formulating their opinion that plaintiff was not

injured.

(R. 208-210, 756, 767-768)

The x-rays shows some

arthritic changes to the spine but were otherwise normal.
752, 753)

(R.

The myelogram showed no trauma induced abnormalities.

(R. 753)
On a referral from Dr. Rich, plaintiff saw Dr. John
Barbuto, a Board certified neurologist.

(R. 702-704)

Plaintiff

saw Dr. Barbuto on February 23, 1983, and then again on March 8,
1983 (R. 662), less than five months after the accident with
defendant occurred and certainly not more than six months as
plaintiff in his brief claims.
Dr. Barbuto conducted a neurological examination of
plaintiff which proved essentially normal.

(R. 672)

Dr. Barbuto

elaborated regarding his findings by stating:
A. Let's look at the data that I had.
At that point, I didn't really have any
significant data for a serious injury.
His exam looked fine. Some number of
things tend to conclude that. Initially,
he didn't even go to a doctor, he went to
a masseuse. If he was majorly injured,
that probably would not have been his
course. So, I didn't have any good data
to suggest that there was a major injury
going on initially.
So, I think with regard to deciding if
the injury has healed, we have to first
establish if there was indeed a major
injury. If we say, "minor forms of
injury", which the doctor can't document,
many people go out and spring fingers or
get something or other that the doctor
can't see, that happens but those things
tend to be shortlived. Could that have
been there and could that have healed, the
answer is probably yes. Is it possible?
It is a minor thing happening? It is
always possible. I would presume that

would have healed. As I said, I saw no
evidence of a serious process and the
course of things did not suggest that that
reflected an underlying serious process
which would be expected to be ongoing.
Q. Well, so what, in your opinion,
could account for this prolonged symptoms
that Mr. Sanders was complaining?
A. One of the things I see a lot now
days is a very, very complicated process
which is called "stress physiology". It
is a very real process.
Dr. Barbuto then explained "stress physiology" to the jury and
related it to Sanders' situation:
A. Let's start off with a couple of
simple examples. Everybody I think is
used to thinking in terms of a person gets
under stress and they get an ulcer.
Stress causes some change and a person get
a hole in their stomach, nobody is
questioning that there is something there.
If somebody says they have pain in there,
no one questions that they have pain.
High blood pressure, it is very well written up in Ladies' Home Journal and
everything else about stress causing high
blood pressure and I am sure also people
have read about what is called the "Type A
Personality." The real go-getter, often
executives or aggressive kinds of people
who get higher incidents of heart attacks.
So what happens if there is now this
increasing understanding that stress does
things to our bodies.
-k

-k

-k

All right, well, I see people who now
get symptoms on that basis where the major
cause of their symptoms, over the long
haul, is that kind of process. We see a
lot of people with tension headaches. I
will tell you more about that later. Lots
of people without an abnormal pain problem
and back pain problems. Certainly the
ulcer or the colitis, the palpatations or

shortness of breath, excessive tiredness,
wide movement strain or difficulty
sleeping, ringing in the ears or blurry
vision.
Q. Doctor, are those symptoms, as you
described them, are they in your
experience caused by the stress?
A. Yeah, that is what we see.
what the patient tells us.
•

*

That is

*

Q. What I want to know, doctor, insofar
-- letfs bring it back to Mr. Sanders.
Now, is one thing then that you have
testified that could account for his -this prolonged symptom is some sort of
stress or anxiety?
A. Yes, physiology would easily account
for the kind of symptoms he has and also
explain a number of things about how the
symptoms have progressed.
Q. Would things like marital problems,
could that create that kind or problem?
A. Stress is different things for different people. It can be jobs or marital
or some other very personal issue. A lot
of times, we don't know because people
wonft tell us. A lot of times we don't
know.
Q.

Financial difficulty?

A.

Sure.

Q.

Wife being laid off work?

A. All kinds of things. there are
other possibilities. (R. 672-675)
Dr. Barbuto stated clearly that Sanders1 perceived symptoms were likely a result of secondary gain and stresses. He
reiterated that stresses without any trauma whatsoever could

e a s i l y cause the kind of symptoms of which p l a i n t i f f

complained.

(R. 684, 690)
Dr. Barbuto summarized his opinions by stating:
Q. (By Mr. Burton) Doctor Barbuto,
focusing in on Mr. Sanders, do you have an
opinion, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, whether or not the accident
that Mr. Sanders was involved in on
September 25, 1982 was the cause of the
symptoms that he related to you when you
saw him in February and March of ! 83.
A. I think the answer is no. I don't
think that the data fits very well with
that conclusion. It fits very well with
an alternative conclusion which is stress
physiology, which I see all the time.
Q. Do you have an opinion whether the
accident caused stress and anxiety in Mr.
Sanders and whether that anxiety continued
and that was sufficient to cause the symptoms of which he complained in February
and March of '83?
A. Again, I can give you a long
discussion and point out why I would say
what I am going to say. The answer is,
no, I don't think that fits with the data.
(R. 686, 687)
Dr. Barbuto then explained why he reached the conclusions which
he did:
A. First of all, if we ask the
question, and this is a good question,
does an accident produce the stress that
then produces the personfs symptoms,
reasonable question, if that is the case
there are certain things we would expect
to see. We would expect to see that, for
instance, the stress would be present as a
manifestation of the accident, would not
be dependent on such things as the social
circumstances of the accident, that is to
say, who is at fault. It would have to be
a phenomenon from the trauma itself. As I

pointed out, that isn't what we observed.
It doesn't appear that one can argue that
stress would be a derivative of the mechanics of the accident and that would
account for the person's symptoms.
Secondly, if we assume or again a reasonable assumption, that the worse the accident, the more the stress. Somebody comes
into an emergency room with broken bones
going every different direction and a ruptured liver, we have to assume that person
is under terrible stress, yet they don't
get chronic pain syndrome. When we have
people who have major trauma, broken bones
going very way, we don't see this. . .
The other function that would be
expected is that if it was purely related
to the trauma of the accident, that person's symptoms would clearly correspond to
the accident and would take a certain pattern. And they often don't. We often use
these kinds of things coming on weeks or
months later, as opposed to coming on
immediately or we see people continue to
worsen rather than getting better. Many
other kinds of things that just don't fit
very well with the conclusion that, yes,
they have an accident and that generates
the stress and that generates the symptoms. There is a lot of data that supports that, and I can go on and on, but
anyway there are a lot of other things
that we see that refute that conclusion.
(R. 687-689)
Further elaborating on the role of stress and tension
producing the kind of symptoms of which plaintiff complained,
Barbuto testif ied:
Q. Doctor, the kinds of symptoms concerning which Mr. Sanders complains,
headaches, tinnitis or ringing in the ear,
neck pain and shoulder pain, do you see
those kinds of symptoms more frequently as
a result of stress and tension than, say,
other kinds of symptoms?
A. I see at least one or two new
patients a day with tension headache

syndrome. They have these same kinds of
things. They get a symptom complex. They
may get one or more of the symptoms,
headache, back pain, arm numbness, leg
numbness, ringing in the ear, vision
blurry, tiredness, difficulty sleeping,
passing out spells. I see that combination in some form every day. (R. 690,
691)
The doctor summarized by stating he saw no evidence that Sanders
was injured or that his perceived symptoms were caused by the
accident (R. 672-673, 689)
Plaintiff built his case around a "fibrositis11 diagnosis.

However, plaintiff's own treating physician, Dr. Goka,

testified that fibrositis is a controversial diagnosis and many
doctors do not believe it exists at all.
confirmed Dr. Goka on this point.

(R. 558)

Dr. Barbuto

Insofar as the plaintiff's

fibrositis claim is concerned, Dr. Barbuto testified:
Q. Now, doctor, Dr. Goka has been here
earlier and you have reviewed his records
as well. He has testified as diagnosing
Mr. Sanders and he said it is his opinion
he has fibrositis. Are you familiar with
that diagnosis?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell us, is that a controversial kind of diagnosis?
A. It is a very controversial symptom.
First of all, because lots of people don't
believe it can exist. Some do believe it
exists. It is usually invoked in the same
kind of patient we see stress physiology.
Very often in these kinds of accidents and
tension headaches. If you look at the
description, what is called fibrositis, it
is often the same as called tension
headaches, low back pain. If you look at
the medical literature, and I have a

number of examples here, they refer to it
as a nebulous thing. People are not
really sure what it is. It doesn't exist
when they look at demographics, which are
studies of population dynamics, . . . .
(R. 691)
Dr. Barbuto then read about fibrositis from Beeson and McDermic,
a well-accepted, authoritative, two volume medical textbook:
A. "The term 'fibrositis1 has been
applied to a poorly defined symptom
complex which is characterized by pain and
stiffness in various areas. Most commonly, the neck, shoulder girdle and the
posterior aspect of the trunk, the back,
the low back . . . the soft tissue will be
muscles and the tendons and things that
hold them all together. Physical signs
. . . many laboratory and roentgen ray
studies are negative. The term fibrositis
is based on vague hypothesis and common
usage rather than on anatomic abnormalities . A localized area of tenderness
common in the peripheral area medial to
the scapula, have been termed 'trigger
points.1 The syndrome usually begins in
middle years of life because the majority
of patients appear tense and anxious, have
few recognizable objectable basis for
their symptoms. The symptom is often considered psychogenic, which means pain and
stiffness can be manifestations of a
majority of (reading very rapidly) . . .
an exclusion of more defined illnesses.
[Emphasis added]
That is the kind of thing people write
about fibrositis. (R. 691, 693)
Dr. Barbuto then stated he had a computer service called
Medline.

(R. 693)

Using Medline he excerpted and abstracted all

articles written on fibrositis from 1979 on, and he brought a
thick computer printout with him to court.
summarized the literature as follows:

(R. 694)

Dr. Barbuto

A. Basically, everything everybody sort
of says is, "Well, I don't see anything.
Okay, maybe there is something there but
whatever it is, it's beginning, it is not
a big deal." People try injections or
just some known steroid medication. Every
conclusion basically seems to be: Okay,
find something. There is something there
because people complain of something but
whatever it seems to be is not enough to
produce abnormalities of the tests and not
enough to be serious. And basically most
of the articles come out with their
conclusions being reassuring this isn't
serious and put them on some local
anesthetics which are the shots and some
muscle relaxants or some tranquilizers and
most of the articles reflect the use of
amitriphyline which is a drug we use very
commonly for treating tension headaches.
Many of the articles refer to stress and
anxiety. Many of these articles refer to
the role of anxiety and stress processes
and this kind of thing. (R. 695)
Dr. Barbuto did not believe that any of Sanders' p
ceived symptoms were as a result of the automobile accident
September, 1982, including Sanders' position that he was a
of fibrositis.

Dr. Barbuto testified:

Q. Now, can fibrositis be caused simply
by old age and stress incident to old age
according to the literature?
A. Since people argue as to what it is
and if it even is, it becomes harder still
to argue what causes it. As I said, many
people refer to it as psychiatric illness
or a psychology process where it is stress
related. Many of the articles refer to
high correlation with that. , , .
Q. If we assume, hypothetically, that
Mr. Sanders has what we have difficulty
defining as fibrositis, do you have an
opinion as to whether or not the accident
would be a cause of that kind of manifestation later on?

A. Well, yeah, I have some opinions, I
think, first of all, when we are talking
about fibrositis, we are talking about
this nebulous thing. Secondly, we observe
again that people with not compensated
accidents or the other person in those
kinds of accidents, doesnft get fibrositis. So, that suggests that it is not
something that is a derivative of the
accident. So, therefore, we are dealing
with an entity when they are talking about
fibrositis that is not very clear and such
sayings related to an accident is more
abstract because it does not correlate
with a lot of the things that one would
expect from the accident. We don't see
it, for instance, in everybody. That sort
of thing. (R. 696, 697)
In his brief, plaintiff claims Dr. Barbuto had only read
one article on fibrositis anl that article accounted for the doctor's expertise on the subject.

This simply was not true as Dr.

Barbuto's testimony made abundantly clear.

(R. 691, 692, 695)

Also, plaintiff claims that in formulating his opinions,
Dr. Barbuto did not review other doctors' reports and medical
records.

This claim is false.

Dr. Barbuto did review all

available medical records on James Sanders after he examined him
but before formulating his opinion.

(R. 669)

The doctor

explained the reason he proceeded in this fashion was to enable
him to be totally objective and to examine the patient without
any preconceived notions.

(R. 669)

It is clear that Dr. Barbuto had the same access to
medical reports and information as did Dr. Goka and yet Dr.
Barbuto did not conclude that plaintiff sustained any injury in
his accident of September 25, 1982.

In fact, before he testified

at trial, Dr. Barbuto reviewed all of Dr. Goka's records, the
records from the St. Lukefs Pain Clinic, and Sanders1 test
results.

His opinion was unshaken.

(R. 713)

Plaintiff did not see Dr. Goka until more than a month
and a half after he saw Dr. Barbuto.

(R. 561)

Dr. Goka never

personally diagnosed a cervical strain since by his own testimony, had Sanders sustained a cervical strain, its effects would
have lasted only six to eight weeks.

(R. 525)

Dr. Goka asserted

that plaintiff had fibrositis which was an outgrowth of an injury
which plaintiff sustained in the September, 1982 accident. On
cross-examination, however, Dr. Goka was forced to admit that
records from St. Luke's contained references to Sanders
sustaining whiplash injuries in two accidents prior to September
25, 1982.

(R. 592, 593)

Dr. Goka did not know what medical

treatment plaintiff may have received because of these accidents,
and he never discussed the matter of these accidents with any
personnel from St. Luke's.

(R. 593) Plaintiff chose not to call

any of the doctors at St. Luke's to testify.
In his brief, plaintiff misstates Dr. Goka's testimony
in numerous critical instances.

For example, plaintiff asserts

that Dr. Goka "made specific reference to the findings of two
other doctors, Dr. Evans and Dr. Rich, both of whom saw plaintiff
promptly after the accident and reported that plaintiff suffered
a cervical strain in his collision with defendant."
Brief, p. 11)

This statement is simply untrue.

Evans and Dr. Rich were not in evidence.

(Plaintiff's

Reports of Dr.

These doctors did not

testify.

Moreover, Dr. Goka testified he did not see a report

from Dr. Rich nor did he talk to Dr. Rich about his prognosis.
(R. 582, 583)

The only reference to Dr. Rich was in cross-

examination when defendant's counsel asked if it was true that
Dr. Rich found "no neurological deficit."

To reiterate, plain-

tiff's claim that Dr. Goka read from Dr. Rich's report and that
this helped Dr. Goka formulate his opinion, is simply contrary to
Dr. Goka's testimony.

As noted, Dr. Goka was not aware of Dr.

Rich's report and never spoke with him.

(R. 583)

Insofar as Dr. Evans is concerned, there is no evidence
in the record as to what Dr. Evans' report consisted of.

There

is no evidence suggesting that Dr. Evans concluded that plaintiff
was injured in the September 25, 1982 accident with plaintiff.
In his testimony, Dr. Goka did say he reviewed a report from Dr.
Barbuto and reviewed certain radiographic studies of plaintiff.
(R. 527)

However, Dr. Goka never explained how these matters

assisted him in any way in formulating the opinions he reached
since Dr.

Barbuto concluded that there were no signs that plain-

tiff sustained any injury and since the radiographic studies of
Sanders were normal.
In his brief at page 9, plaintiff makes the incorrect
statement that he suffered from tinnitis and that "independent
testing performed by Dr. Nielsen, an ear specialist, stated that
the tinnitis was a direct result of the subject automobile
accident." There is no such evidence in the record and the record
citations contained in plaintiff's brief are misplaced.

Dr.

Nielsen did not testify and no medical reports of his were
admitted into evidence.

(R. 550)

In his testimony, Dr. Goka did

allude to a report from Dr. Nielsen which suggested tinnitis was
related to the accident, but it is clear that Dr. Nielsen did not
see Sanders except on referral from Dr. Goka, and the only information Dr. Nielsen, or Dr. Goka for that matter, had about the
accident of September 25, 1982, was what plaintiff told them.
Insofar as tinnitis is concerned, Dr. Goka admitted that his
belief that plaintiff suffered from tinnitis was based upon subjective, not objective, criteria.

(R. 565-567)

In his brief at page 8, plaintiff claims that "Dr. Goka
testified that St. Luke's medical reports were submitted to him
and that these confirmed that James Sanders had suffered a cervical strain which in turn caused f ibrositis.,f

In referring to

those records, Dr. Goka's testimony was, "he [Sanders] had a
flexion extension injury caused by a cervical strain, although he
had fibrositis and also he was depressed."

(R. 548)

There is no

evidence suggesting that the St. Luke's records ever implied a
causal relationship between cervical strain and fibrositis.
Moreover, the records from St. Luke's noted that plaintiff
sustained cervical strain in two accidents prior to September 25,
1982.

(R. 592)
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Goka was an expert in fibro-

sitis and yet neglects to inform the court that Dr. Goka, himself, testified fibrositis is a controversial diagnosis and many
qualified physicians simply do not believe in it.

(R. 558)

Plaintiff contends that Dr. Goka referred him to the St.
Luke's Pain Clinic in Phoeniz, Arizona.

However, Dr. Goka

admitted that plaintiff's counsel suggested that this referral be
made and that plaintiff's counsel wrote him a letter which read
in pertinent part as follows:
It would help me if in your letter to St.
Lukes you make it sufficiently strong, as
a matter of medical necessity, dealing
both with the injury, the resultant fibrositis and the resultant depression that is
all connected to the automobile accident
of September 25, 1982 and is all necessary
as a medical matter. (R. 589)
On cross-examination, Dr. Goka admitted that when he
first saw plaintiff on April 13, 1983, he reviewed plaintiff's xrays which were normal, plaintiff's myelogram results which were
normal.
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(R. 81)

He found no objective signs of tinnitis.

(R.

He read Dr. Barbuto's report and agreed that there were no

neurological issues.

(R. 568)

Although he equivocated with

fibrosities patients, he agreed with the concept of secondary
gain and that the very idea of rewarding symptoms is a primary
cause of the symptoms themself.

(R. 576)

He admitted during his

treatment of plaintiff that plaintiff had a high anxiety level
and he conceded that anxiety and stress can cause the manifestations of headaches, neck pain and shoulder pain (R. 584), and
that pain can be psychogenic in origin caused by stresses,
depression and other things totally unrelated to trauma.
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(R.

Dr. Goka also admitted that the St. Luke's Pain Clinic

administered a number of tests to plaintiff -- EEG, Cat scans,

etc. -- and that the results of these tests were all negative and
showed no abnormality of any kind,

(R. 588)

Dr. Spencer, a Board certified orthopedic surgeon, was
the final witness who testified at trial. He examined plaintiff
in March of 1984, and he reviewed all medical records pertaining
to plaintiff.
In his brief, plaintiff attempts to convince the Court
that Dr. Spencer did not review the medical records pertaining to
him because according to plaintiff, Dr. Spencer was not
interested in the "inuendos and inferences" of treating physicians.

Plaintiff's attempted criticism of Dr. Spencer is wholly

misplaced.

On cross-examination, Dr. Spencer explained:
Q. Another thing I want to clarify, as
I understood your testimony at the start
of your direct examination, you said that
you thought you had all of these various
reports that you have listed available in
hand but that you examined Mr. Sanders and
then went through them to see if they confirmed or disagreed with whatever was your
diagnosis?
A. What I try and do is try and be as
objective as I can. So I don't get a bias
built in from other examiners. But I also
try and make sure I don't miss an area
that has been brought out before that the
patient either has forgotten about or
doesn't want to bring it out. And so I
review that, as I talked with him briefly,
but I go into the analysis later.
Q.

Analysis of the other reports?

A.

Right.

Q. If you wanted to have everything,
these other sources could feed you. You
would study them carefully before your

examination so you couldn't miss anything
in what they had?
A. If I were interested in the innuendos and the inferences and before the examination, then that would be the best way
to do it, yes.
Q. Essentially, you put them aside
until you have completed your examination
and then you work from them in detail?
A. That is right. To make my diagnosis, I evaluate the patient's story he
told. The physical examination and the
record. (R. 774, 775)
In his brief at page 16, plaintiff states, "Neither Dr.
Barbuto nor Dr. Spencer made any claim or statement that plaintiff had not been injured as he claimed."
true.

This statement is not

Dr. Barbuto's testimony is detailed above.

testimony is summarized below.

Dr. Spencer's

Both doctors testified they saw

no evidence of any injury.
Dr. Spencer tested plaintiff's range of motion and found
it to be normal.

(R. 747, 748)

Plaintiff had a normal grip pat-

tern, normal circumference of his two arms, normal Atkins test
and normal sensation.

(R. 748-750)

Dr. Spencer noted that plaintiff said he had tenderness
in several sites but that when the doctor palpated these areas
with plaintiff distracted, there was no sign of tenderness.
750-752)
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Dr. Spencer also noted that plaintiff complained of

decreased sensation in the forearm area but that this claim made
no anatomical sense.
doctor testified:

(R. 751)

Regarding these subjects, the

Q. Did you do any pushing or palpatation with Mr. Sanders distracted or doing
something else?
A. I did. I wanted to evaluate. See,
pain is strictly a subjective situation
and you have to rely entirely on the
patient's response.
Q. So you say when you are talking
about these areas of tenderness that that
was a subjective kind of a thing where you
pressed and he said it hurts?
A. That is right. So, I did repeat
these tests when he was distracted and
looking away and was responding to another
request of mine and I didn't find that
tenderness or complaints of pain when
these areas were palpated. That is, he
didn't respond or withdraw or didn't pull
away to indicate that those areas were
tender.
Q.

Was that significant to you?

A. I felt it was significant. I felt
that perhaps his pain was not an objective
type of pain.
Q. Now, did Mr. Sanders describe -- you
say he described some decreased sensation?
A. Yes, he stated there was a decreased
sensation over the front part of his arm,
forearm area, in the small end that
included his thumb. And that is atypical
for the way our bodies are put together.
The nerves don't supply an area that isn't
formed from the thumb clear on up into the
arm. So this is impossible to explain on
the basis of the anatomy of the body. (R.
750, 751)
Dr. Spencer testified that he saw no objective signs of
any injury.

He stated:
I didn't find anything that I could
measure by way of loss of motion, outside
of the small perimeter that he was -- that

was slightly different or reduced from
normal. I didn't find any reproducible
areas of tenderness when he was
distracted. I think he does have areas of
tenderness on exam when I would examine
him directly, that was reproducible. (R.
752)
Dr. Spencer also observed that he reviewed the x-rays
and myelogram of plaintiff.

On these documents, he saw some evi-

dence of degenerative disc disease which was wholly unrelated to
any kind of trauma which plaintiff may have experienced.

(R.

753, 754, 755)
In explaining plaintiff's symptoms, Dr. Spencer
testified they did not fit any objective pattern and were psychogenic in origin.

(R. 756)

Dr. Spencer also felt that degenera-

tive disc disease unrelated to the accident played a role in
producing Sanders' perceived symptoms.

The doctor testified:

A. Well, I felt that his symptoms were
possibly relating to pre-existing changes,
degenerative changes that we talked about
and probably some other reason that I
couldn't objectively measure. I felt that
the symptoms didn't fit objective patterns. They were what we call
"psychogenic in origin."
Q. You better explain those terms. You
said it didn't fit an objective pattern.
What do you mean by that and then what do
you mean "psychogenic in origin"?
A. I always give the patient the benefit of the doubt and try and find reasons
for the pain. Particular injury, particular area of weakness, particular nerve
that is involved. Something that is
reproducible, that you can go back time
and time again and find and I couldn't
find those things. And so, if you don't
find the objective reasons, arthritis,

fracture, dislocation, then you have to
assume there is some other cause and you
have to look for a psychological ideology.
The doctor further explained as follows:
A. Well, I felt that there was probably
an alternate reason for his symptoms
appearing. We talked about the term
"secondary gain.11 When you talk about
psychological sources of pain, what that
means is that there is a gain to the
patient for having the symptoms, as
bizarre as that sounds. The primary gain
that a patient comes to you with is to
have those symptoms alleviated. But if
there isn't a primary gain, there often is
secondary gain where the individual has
symptoms which are maintained to receive
some compensation of some type. Social,
emotional, reassurance from family, relief
from the stresses of his daily life,
employment pressures that are on him,
financial pressures, sometimes there are
actual monetary gains. Usually these are
in injury situations. You don't see them
in people, as a rule, who are employed,
who are earning an income, who are coping
with life. Did I mix you up?
Q. No. No. So, is this your conclusion of the symptoms that Mr. Sanders was
experiencing psychogenic pain and there
was a secondary gain that was present
there?
A. I felt that -- I was chasing the
diagram notice here. His symptoms were
due to, one, a degenerative cervical and
spine disc decrease. What that means,
degenerative of the cervical and dorsal
spine.
Q. When we talk about degenerative
changes, we think about changes that happen when a person gets older?
A. That is right,
earlier injury. And
the narrowing of the
tic changes that are

with age or with
those are manifest by
disc, by the arthrishown. And then

secondly, I felt there was an overreactive personality that fits this category of the psychological or psychogenic
type of pain. (R. 756-758)
The doctor observed that intervening stresses, anxiety
and tensions such as financial difficulties and marital problems
probably played a key role in Sanders1 condition.

(R. 759)

Insofar as fibrositis is concerned, Dr. Spencer said he
had treated a number of patients who had been diagnosed as having
fibrositis.

(R. 762)

He described the fibrositis diagnosis as

controversial and based strictly on subjective feelings.
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He stated:
It's a diagnosis that is reached by
conclusion of any other disease process
and there is not a way to measure what it
means. And the feeling has been in some
circles that this is kind of a waste
basket diagnosis. (R. 761)
Dr. Spencer was then asked if plaintiff had fibrositis.

He responded as follows:
A. Well, I concluded that he didn't.
The reasons are these: 1, is he did not
have a reproducible pain picture [sic] which
distracted. Secondly, his pain was diffuse and not localized to what are called
"trigger points" in those who have written
of this type of syndrome. And I felt,
thirdly, that during the examination that
there was a tendency toward overexaggeration. Most patients who have a
problem will exaggerate to some extent to
make sure it is recognized. I felt above
and beyond that normal pattern there was a
giving way of testing and overreactivity.
Fourthly, there appeared to be an
inappropriate attitude or emotion. He
didn't have the typical concern about the
problem that you would expect an individual to have with an injury. (R. 761 ,
762)

Dr. Spencer testified that the tinnitis to which plaintiff complained would not be caused by cervical strain.

He said

there are multiple causes of tinnitis but cervical strain is not
one of them.

(R. 53, 63)

Dr. Spencer concluded that plaintiff suffered from no
physical impairment (R. 763), that he could work full time and
this would in fact be therapeutic for him (R. 764), that there
was no reason for plaintiff to limit his activities or hobbies
and that the only treatment plaintiff may need would possibly be
psychiatric in nature.

(R. 765, 766)

The doctor concluded:

A. I didn't find any objective reasons
for his discomfort. I felt there was this
over-exaggeration of his symptoms and he
did have a difficult social background in
the past and he fit the pattern for
someone with an emotional psychogenic or
emotional source of pain. (R. 765)
Evidence was elicited -- much of which Sanders equivocated about or denied, thereby seriously compromising his credibility -- establishing that Sanders experienced numerous stresses
in his life which the doctors testified could cause all of the
symptoms of which Sanders complained.

Within the space of a few

years and before his accident with Ahlstrora, plaintiff had a
hernia operation, back fusion, cancer, surgery resulting in the
removal of a testicle, and over 50 radiation and chemotherpay
treatments.

(R. 488-490)

Plaintiff admitted being involved in

two prior and one subsequent accidents and said he was "scared as
hell" to drive a car.

(R. 471)

Plaintiff's wife lost her job as

a chemist in 1983, and plaintiff experienced marital difficulties

and financial difficulties shortly after his accident.
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Plaintiff did not get along well with his

employer, Farmers Insurance Company, and wanted to change jobs,
(R. 631)

He moved into a new neighborhood subsequent to the

accident,

(R. 472, 473)

All of these pre-existing and inter-

vening stresses are the kinds of things the doctors testified
could cause Sanders1 perceived symptoms of headaches, neck pain,
shoulder pain and ringing of the ears.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Succinctly stated, plaintiff argues that there was no
evidence suggesting he was not injured as a direct and proximate
result of the September 25, 1982, automobile accident with
Kristin Ahlstrom, and therefore the unanimous jury verdict was
wrong.

Plaintiff seeks to convince this court that reasonable

people could never have concluded as did the jury unanimously in
this case and, therefore, the verdict of the fact finders should
be discarded.

He also seeks to convince the court that the

District Court Judge who weighed and considered the evidence
abused his discretion when he denied plaintiff's motion for new
trial.

This argument is untenable for the following reasons, any

one of which is sufficient to uphold the jury verdict and trial
court judgment.
The jury was entitled to discount or disbelieve plaintiff's testimony regarding his claimed injury.

The burden of

proof rested with plaintiff, and he failed to meet his burden.

Credible evidence suggested that plaintiff was not injured in the
September 25, 1982 accident.

If the jury believed plaintiff was

injured, credible evidence suggested that those injuries resulted
from prior accidents, subsequent accidents, stress, anxiety, preexisting degenerative disc disease, or other causes unrelated to
the September 25, 1982 accident.

If injured at all in the

September 25, 1982 accident, plaintiff recovered within a few
days or at most, a few weeks. His medical expenses did not
exceed $500, he had no permanent impairment or disability, and
therefore no valid tort cause of action existed.
ARGUMENT
I.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW.
In this case, there is no indication that the jury
misunderstood or failed to take into account proven facts, misunderstood or disregarded the law or rendered a verdict without
factual support in the evidence.

On the contrary, the verdict is

reasonable and was rendered after careful and thoughtful deliberation by an eight person jury.

Similarly, Judge Russon denied

the motion for new trial after the same careful and thoughtful
deliberation.
Proximate cause, like negligence, is peculiarly a factual
question for the jury.

Waters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah

1981); Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 611
P.2d 363 (Utah 1980).

Once a jury has served its function and

"found the facts", these findings should be given every presump-

tion of validity and should be disturbed only if there is no
basis in the evidence to support them.
Plaintiff, of course, had the burden of proof.
unanimously found that he failed to meet that burden.

The jury

The case

of Gilhespie v. DgJong, 520 P.2d 878 (Utah 1974), speaks clearly
to the burden of proof issue.

In Gilhespie, a bicyclist brought

an action for personal injuries he sustained when struck by an
automobile driven by defendant.

The jury found for defendant and

the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict.

On appeal,

plaintiff argued, "There is no substantial competent evidence to
support the verdict of the jury.11

In affirming the trial court,

this Court stated:
It is to be observed that this proposition
misplaces the burden of proof. That is,
it seems to assume that there must be
substantial evidence to support the jury's
refusal to find for the plaintiff;
whereas, the burden was upon the plaintiff
to make the proof to justify a verdict for
him; and if the jury were not so persuaded
by a preponderance of the evidence, they
were not obligated to render such a verdict.
The recent case of Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah
1983), is directly on point.

In this case, plaintiff, a

passenger in a dune buggy, brought a negligence action against
the driver to recover damages plaintiff sustained when the dune
buggy flipped over.

The trial court judge entered judgment in

favor of defendant on the jury's special verdict.
plaintiff's motion for new trial.

He then denied

This Court affirmed on appeal.

In discussing the role of the jury and the applicable standard on

appeal, this Court stated:
Moreover, it is the prerogative of the
jury to believe one witness over another
and to weigh the evidence. See Hindmarsh
v. P.P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413,
446 P.2d 410 (1968) . On appeal we will
review the juryfs verdict in a light most
favorable to the prevailing party, Lamkin
v. Lynch, Utah, 600 P.2d 530 (1979), and
accord the evidence presented and every
reasonable inference fairly to be drawn
therefrom the same degree of deference.
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.,
supra. Id. 172.
In discussing the trial court's refusal to grant a new
trial based upon plaintiff's allegation that the verdict was not
supported by the evidence, this Court stated:
The trial court has wide discretion
to grant or deny a motion for a new trial
and we do not reverse a denial unless the
"evidence to support the verdict was
completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust.11
IdL 173.
This Court then noted that as long as the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to grant a motion for new trial,
the Supreme Court "cannot interfere." J^d. 173.
Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619 (Utah 1976), involved an
action by a minor plaintiff for injuries she suffered when struck
by defendant's automobile.

The trial court entered judgment of

no cause of action on a jury verdict and denied plaintiff's
motion for new trial.

This Court affirmed on appeal and in so

doing stated:
In addition to what is said about the
prerogatives of the jury, there is the

further proposition that the trial court
reviewed this case and the arguments of
counsel in connection with his decision to
deny the motion for a new trial. This
court has always recognized that the trial
court has considerable latitude of discretion in the granting or denying of a
motion for a new trial in accordance with
his judgment as to what the ends of
justice require; and that his rulings
thereon should not be overturned unless it
appears that his action clearly
transgressed reasonable bounds of
discretion.
This case falls within the ruling we
have heretofore announced: that the purpose of the trial is to afford the parties
a full and fair opportunity to present
their evidence and their contentions and
to have the issues in dispute between them
determined by a jury; and that when that
has been accomplished we will not disturb
the determination made by the jury and the
trial court unless it is shown that there
was substantial and prejudicial error
which prevented a fair trial, or that there
is no substantial basis in the evidence
upon which reasonable minds could conclude
as the jury did. JA. 621 .
In his brief, plaintiff cites and then tries to
distinguish the recent Utah decision of Christenson v. Shear,
688 P.2d 467 (Utah 1984).

Christenson was a case very similar to

the instant case where the jury found that:
. . . plaintiff's claimed injuries were
not proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence running into the rear end of
her car at a traffic stop.
The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and trial court
judgment refusing to disturb the jury's findings on the proximate
cause issue.

In the present case, plaintiff does not claim the jury

was improperly instructed on the causation issues. Rather plaintiff simply says the jury wrongly decided the issue. However, as
recent decisions of this Court attest, a jury verdict on a factual issue after proper instructions are given deserves great
weight and deference.
II.
JURY WAS ENTITLED TO DISCOUNT OR
DISBELIEVE SANDERS' TESTIMONY.
The only basis the jury had to determine that plaintiff
was injured in the September 25, 1982, accident was plaintiff's
own self-serving testimony.

Dr. Goka had no knowledge concerning

the accident and the cause of plaintiff's alleged symptoms other
than what Sanders related.
In Instruction No. 4, an instruction to which plaintiff
took no exception, the jury was told:
You are the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witnesses and the
weight or convincing force of their testimony. In so judging, you can take into
consideration any interest a witness may
have in the lawsuit and any bias or probable motive, or lack thereof, to testify
as they do, if any is shown. You may also
consider the deportment of witnesses upon
the witness stand, the reasonableness or
lack thereof of their statements, their
frankness or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to
understand, their capacity to remember,
and whether any witness contradicted himself or herself, and then determine
therefrom, in accordance with your honest
convictions, what weight and credibility
you should give to the testimony of each
witness, measured by reason and common
sense and the rules set forth in these
instructions.

If you believe a witness has wilfully
testified falsely to any material matter
in this case, you may disregard the whole
of the testimony of such witness except as
you find it to have been corroborated by
other credible evidence, in which event
you should then give it the weight to
which you find it is entitled. (R. 231)
See also Instructions 6, 7 and 10, to which plaintiff likewise
took no exception.

(R. 233, 234, 237)

The instructions are

attached as Appendix 4, 5, 6 and 7, respectively.

These instruc-

tions admonish the jury as fact finders to resolve all conflicts
in the evidence and to reject evidence and testimony of witnesses
altogether if the jury felt there had been falsification or the
reasons given for the testimony were unsound.
Sanders, who certainly had a motive to pin all of his
perceived problems on his September 25, 1982, automobile accident, gave testimony that was unreasonable and riddled with
hyperbole, falsification and untruths.

For example, Sanders

testified as follows:
Plaintiff claimed to have received more medical treatment
which cost more money than was actually the case.

For example,

plaintiff testified that he reviewed all medical bills and back
up documentation before submitting a proposed exhibit showing
medical expenses of $13,156.65.

(R. 469, 503, 504)

These expen-

ses could not be proven and the exhibit was never received as
evidence.

(R. 740, 741)

Therapy expenses with Elaine Lu are an

example of the exaggeration of expenses.

When confronted with

the actual bills on cross-examination, plaintiff was forced to

recant his prior testimony and admit that his therapy expenses
were several hundred dollars less than what he had previously
testified under oath.

(R. 505-508) Finally, plaintiff's counsel

reduced his claim for medical expenses to $10,000 to which defendant's counsel stipulated with the following caveat:
I do not stipulate and sharply contest
that these charges, any of them are as a
result of the accident and that the medical expenses were necessary. (R. 741)
Plaintiff testified he never told Ahlstrom or anyone
else that he experienced a "prior whiplash."

(R. 511) This is

completely contrary to the unequivocal testimony of Ahlstrom, the
testimony given by Mrs. Ahlstrom!s son and mother, and is inconsistent with testimony given by the investigating officer.

(R.

651-653)
Plaintiff was involved in a serious automobile accident in
July of 1983, the effects of which he tried to downplay and discount.

(R. 491-493)

However, the photographs of plaintiff's Fiat

automobile involved in that accident obviously depicted the impact
and force of the accident was much more severe than was the case in
the accident of September, 1982.

(See Exhibits 13-D - 20-D)

Plaintiff exaggerated the impact speed, force of impact,
and damage to his car resulting from the September, 1982 accident.

(R. 354, 355)

The photographs show that damage to the

vehicles was minimal in this accident and the impact speed, given
the fact that Sanders' car was knocked forward only a few feet,
had to be very low.

(Exhibits 2-P, 30-D)

(David Lord testified

that had the impact speed been 20 mph, Sanders1 car would have
been knocked forward 30 feet and had the impact speed been but 15
mph, Sanders1 car still would traveled ahead 18 feet).

(R. 415,

416)
On the witness stand, plaintiff tried to give an account
of the accident which would comport with Dave Lord's testimony,
i.e., Sanders did not know the distance his car was knocked forward at the time of the accident, the color of the traffic light,
or whether cars in front of him had already started to move at
the time of impact.

(R. 429, 430, 511-514) The trouble with

plaintiff's new account of the accident as was pointed out on
cross-examination was that it was contrary to what Sanders said
in his deposition.

At his deposition he said he stopped within a

car length, the light was red when the accident occurred, his car
was knocked forward two or three feet and he came to a stop
within half a car length of the car in front.

(R.

511-514 and

Deposition of James Sanders, pp. 24, 43, 44)
Although he had separate files to review for each
insurance policy he maintained, (R. 514) plaintiff in an apparant
attempt to bolster his claim for loss of income testified that by
June of 1984, his insurance policy count dropped to 213.

(R.

514, 515) But plaintiff's supervisor Hal Brostrum testified and
produced records which were received as exhibits which clearly
established that Sanders' policy count was 451 in June of 1984.
(R. 610, Exhibit D-29)
Sanders denied ever saying he did not want to return to

work for Farmers, yet the evidence reveals this is precisely what
he said to Carl Checka, a rehabilitation specialist who testified
at trial and what he also said to personnel at the St. Luke's
Pain Clinic.

(R. 631)

On direct examination, plaintiff testified his income
had dropped off markedly since the accident (R. 454, 455, 462),
yet on cross-examination he was forced to admit it had actually
been greater since the accident.

In fact, Sanders' net income

figures from 1978 through 1983 were $745, $2,065, $2,083, $1,571,
$2,267 and $3,462, respectively.

The most income Sanders ever

earned during this five-year period was 1983, the year following
the accident.

(R. 517, Exhibits 13, 21-25)

Yet, Sanders tried

to convince the court and jury that he sustained a significant
loss of income.
The symptoms of which plaintiff complained were unreal.
Dr. Spencer testified that when he conducted his examination,
Sanders complained of several tender or trigger sites but that
when Dr. Spencer palpatated Sanders with Sanders distracted the
areas were not tender.

(R. 750-752)

Sanders exaggerated or falsified his symptoms.

Despite

all of Sanders1 protests, medical persons found no objective
signs of any injury.

(See generally testimony of Dr. Barbuto

and Dr. Spencer)
One of the intervening stresses which could have caused
Sanders1 perceived problems was financial difficulties.

On the

witness stand, Sanders tried to skirt around this by saying his

wife lost her job before the September 1982 accident. However,
Sanders was forced to admit on cross-examination, the tax returns
clearly show Mrs. Sanders lost her job in 1983 after the accident
and not 1982, before the accident.

(R. 496, 497)

The foregoing are merely illustrative.

But as noted,

plaintiffs' testimony was riddled with inconsistency, exaggeration, and falsification.

The jury as a group of reasonable

people would have been fully justified in disregarding Sanders1
testimon}^ entirely and concluding that the various symptoms of
which he complained were not real or had nothing to do with the
minor, fender-bender

automobile accident in which he was

involved on September 25, 1982.
III.
ABUNDANT EVIDENCE SUGGESTS SANDERS WAS NOT
INJURED IN THE SEPTEMBER 25, 1982
ACCIDENT.
Dr. Barbuto saw and tested Sanders in February of 1983.
Dr. Barbuto testified that at that time -- just a few months
after the accident —

Sanders was not disabled or impaired in any

way, there were no objective signs of injury, and the symptoms of
which Sanders complained had nothing whatsoever to do with his
prior automobile accident, but rather were probably a result of
unrelated stress and tension or secondary gain.
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(R. 660-697,

From Dr. Barbutofs testimony alone, the jury could reaso-

nably infer Sanders was not injured in the accident of September
25, 1982.

Dr. Spencer saw and tested Sanders in March of 1984.
He likewise concluded that Sanders1 was not disabled or physically impaired, there were no objective signs of any injury and
that Sanders1 "symptoms" must result from some cause other than
the September 1982 accident.

Dr. Spencer thought there were

several explanations for Sanders1 subjective complaints, not the
least of which were pre-existing psycological problems, intervening traumatic events, and a very real secondary gain phenomenon caused not by the accident but by the lawsuit.

Dr. Spencer

testified there was no reason Sanders should restrict or limit
his activities in any way.

(R. 743-766) Once again, from this

testimony alone, the jury could certainly conclude Sanders
sustained no injury on September 15, 1982.
Neither from their examination of Sanders or their
review of the medical records did Dr. Spencer or Dr. Barbuto
observe any objective signs of injury to Sanders. X-rays were
normal, orthopedic and neurologic tests were normal, CAT-scans
were normal, other tests were normal.

On the basis of all of

this evidence plus the minor impact speed of the automobiles,
Sanders activities after the accident (going to lunch with his
family), and Sanders1 own lack of credibility, a jury could certainly have concluded that Sanders was not injured at all in the
accident.
In an attempt to bolster his claim that he sustained
injury in the September 25, 1982 accident, plaintiff makes statements in his brief which simply are not true. Many of these

statements have been discussed above in the Statement of Facts.
However, some additional discussion is warranted here.

In his

brief at page 24, plaintiff states, "He felt immediate back and
neck pain when defendant's car struck his car.
confirmed this."
record.

Plaintiff's wife

This statement is a misrepresentation of the

Mrs. Sanders' testimony is contained at pages 615-620 of

the record.

She was not asked a single question about this sub-

ject matter.
In his brief at page 25, plaintiff claims that Dr.
Gordon Evans diagnosed him as having suffered a cervical strain
in the collision.

Plaintiff relies on pages 526 and 527 of the

record to support this claim.

Plaintiff's claim is false since

there is no evidence in the record of Dr. Evans' diagnosis.
Plaintiff claims that Dr. Rich confirmed Dr. Evans' diagnosis and
cites pages 582 and 583 of the record in support of this claim.
Once again, the record is devoid of support for plaintiff's
claim.
At page 29 of his brief, plaintiff makes the very
interesting assertion that neither of defendant's doctors are in
a position to say that plaintiff had not sustained a cervical
strain in the September 25, 1982 accident because they examined
him for the first time long after the three to 12 week healing
period for the cervical strain had run.
plaintiff's position is obvious.

The inconsistency of

On the one hand, plaintiff

claims that Dr. Barbuto's testimony should have been discounted
by the jury and yet on the other hand, claims the jury should

have readily endorsed Dr. Goka's testimony even though Dr. Goka
did not first see plaintiff until a month and a half after Dr.
Barbuto did.
On page 33 of his brief, plaintiff states:

"The nega-

tive evidence given by Drs. Barbuto and Spencer that they did not
see evidence of the original injury when they examined plaintiff
is not sufficient to overcome the positive evidence of Drs. Evans
and Rich.11

Once again, this position is curious since Drs. Evans

and Rich gave no evidence and no medical reports from them were
introduced into evidence.

Plaintiff's position is also curious

since both Dr. Barbuto and Dr. Spencer testified at trial, gave
their opinions that they saw no signs or evidence of injury and
yet both of these doctors reviewed the medical records on plaintiff including reports by Dr. Evans and Dr. Rich and Dr. Barbuto
even spoke orally with Dr. Rich whereas Dr. Goka did not review
any reports from Dr. Rich and never spoke with him.
IV.
SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS
SANDERS' INJURIES, IF ANY, RESULTED FROM
PRIOR ACCIDENTS, SUBSEQUENT ACCIDENTS,
STRESS, ANXIETY, OR OTHER CAUSES UNRELATED
TO THE SEPTEMBER 25, 1982 ACCIDENT.
There was substantial and credible evidence suggesting
that Sanders1 injuries, if any, occurred prior to the accident in
question.

Plaintiff had indeed sustained a prior whiplash.

He

told Kristin Ahlstrom this and she contemporaneously related what
he had said to her son and mother.

(R. 651-653, 725)

Additionally, plaintiff was questioned about medical records from
St. Lukes1 which he admitted having reviewed.

(R. 729)

There

was reference in these records to whiplash injuries from two
rear-end automobile accidents, both of which predated the
September 25, 1982 accident.

(R. 592)

Also, Sanders himself

admitted having a sore back and neck after one of the earlier
accidents.

(R. 435, 436)

Additionally, Sanders said he had seen

Burt Kidman, the physical therapist and chiropractor several
times in the past for kinks in his back.
more specific.

(R. 485, 486)

Sanders refused to be

Interestingly, although Kidman was

the first medical person seen by James Sanders after his
September 25, 1982, accident, plaintiff chose not to call Kidman
as a witness.

Additionally, unrebutted testimony established

Sanders1 had previously experienced an operation where disks in
his lower back were fused together.
suggests serious prior back problems.

(R. 488) This certainly
In his brief plaintiff

makes the unfounded accusation that defendant's insurance company
represented the two drivers involved in Sanders' prior accidents.
This claim is incorrect, false and improper.

Defendant's insurer

had no record of either accident and of course plaintiff refused
to provide the names of other drivers or the dates of the accidents.

(R. 510, 511)
As noted above, plaintiff was involved in an accident on

July 3, 1983.

Evidence was introduced showing the impact speed

was high and damage to the vehicles significant.

(Exhibits

13-D-20-D) Plaintiff's counsel himself introduced evidence

suggesting that Sanders was injured as a result of this July,
1983 accident.
Medical experts testified that stress and tension can
cause physical problems -- tension headaches, ulcers, head and
shoulder pain, fibrocitis -- and in their opinion, stresses and
tensions played a significant role in Sanders1 situation.
670-676, 759)

(R.

Abundant evidence established that Sanders was

under a lot of stress and tension, and, as established by Dr.
Barbuto and Dr.

Spencer, there was really no nexus between these

stresses and tensions and Sanders1 September, 1982 accident.
686-688, 759, 765)

Sanders1 stresses included the following:

(R.
As

noted, he had problems with work and did not desire to continue
working for Farmer's Insurance Company.
difficulties.

He experienced marital

He endured a serious bout with cancer resulting in

the removal of a testicle and over 50 radiation treatments. He
performed poorly at his job and experienced resultant financial
difficulties which were exacerbated when his wife, a chemist,
lost her job.

He moved into a new home and strange neighborhood.

He had serious pre-existing psychological problems so much so
that Dr. Spencer testified that

no future treatment except

psychological counseling would be of any assistance to him.

(R.

765)
Evidence established that secondary gain is a very real
phenomenon and both Dr. Spencer and Dr. Barbuto thought it, not
Sanders1 September, 1982 accident, was a major cause of Sanders1
perceived symptoms.

(R. 677-684, 757)

V.
IF INJURED AT ALL, SANDERS RAPIDLY
RECOVERED AND HAD NO TORT CAUSE OF ACTION.
Testimony from all doctors, including Dr. Goka, was uniform.

The doctors stated that a cervical strain normally heals

completely within a few days, or at most, a few weeks -- Dr.
Barbuto "a few days" (R. 672); Dr. Goka "six to eight weeks" (R.
525).
In light of the clear medical testimony, it is reasonable to conclude that Sanders was not injured in the September
25, 1982 accident or that if he did suffer a neck strain, the
strain healed completely within a couple of weeks, causing no
disability or impairment whatsoever.

If it is assumed, arguendo,

that Sanders did sustain such a neck strain which healed within
the time period all of the doctors said it would, it is clear
that Sanders1 "injury" resulting from the accident never exceeded
the no-fault threshold prescribed by §31-41-9, Utah Code
Annotated, (1954 as amended).
No evidence was submitted regarding exactly what medical
expenses were incurred by plaintiff, when they were incurred, or
if any of the medical expenses were necessary.

Dr. Goka testi-

fied about future medical expenses, not past expenses.
from any health care providers testified.

No one

Plaintiff was not

qualified to testify whether medical expenses he incurred were
necessary or not and indeed, he did not do so.
examination, plaintiff finally admitted

On cross-

he did not know what

expenses were incurred or when they were incurred.
505-508)

(R. 443,

Dr. Spencer and Dr. Barbuto testified there was nothing

physically wrong with plaintiff, that he was not disabled and
that a cervical strain heals itself in very short order.

On the

basis of this testimony, the jury could certainly have inferred
that any medical expenses which plaintiff incurred were not
necessary even assuming plaintiff had sustained a cervical strain
in the injury of September 25, 1982.
In short, there is no evidence that Sanders1 medical
expenses during the period of time it would take his claimed cervical strain to heal came close to $500, or that any medical
expenses were necessary to facilitate the healing process.
Moreover, the record is clear that from the testimony of Dr.
Barbuto and Dr. Spencer that Sanders did not sustain any permanent impairment or disability.

Therefore, Sanders simply had

no valid cause of action and the jury verdict should and could be
sustained on this basis.
CONCLUSION
On several bases the evidence clearly supports,
sustains and upholds the jury's unanimous answer to Special
Interrogatory No. 3 which reads:
Did James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his injuries,
if any, were proximately caused by the
accident in question?
Answer:

No.

The jury was charged with the duty of finding the facts,

resolving conflicts in evidence, and believing the testimony they
thought was credible.

The jury did precisely that, and its ver-

dict should not be ignored.
It should be noted that plaintiff's counsel did not and
does not now object to the form of the Special Verdict which was
given to the jury.

He merely argues that the jury was comprised

of eight persons, not one of whom reasonably could have concluded
as he or she each did, and that the trial judge who heard and
weighed the evidence, abused his discretion when he denied the
motion for new trial.
For the reasons specified, the jury verdict should be
upheld and the judgment of the trial court affirmed in all
respects.
Dated this

j "

day of May, 1985.
STR0rfd& HANNI,

.. Burton
Attorneys for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Respondent's Brief was mailed, first class postage

prepaid,

this

/*!

day of May, 1985, to the

following

Samuel King
Attorney for Plaintiff
301 Gump & Ayers Building
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES LEE SANDERS,
Plaintiff,

]
;>

SPECIAL VERDICT

]i

Civil No. C-83-692

))

Honorable Leonard Russon

vs.
KRISTIN S. AHLSTROM,
Defendant.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:
At the end of each question submitted to you, indicate
whether you adopt it as your verdict by answering "Yes" or "No".
You can answer "Yes" only if there is a preponderance of the evidence concerning the question.
In the event you cannot find an answer "Yes", and by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must find the same "No".
It requires the concurrence and agreement of at least
six jurors to answer a question, and when six or more jurors
agree upon an answer you should have the foreperson write in the
answer and proceed to the next proposition.
When you have answered all propositions that require an
answer, the foreperson should then sign and date the verdict and
return it to the courtroom.

We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled case,
find the following answers to the interrogatories listed below:
1.

Did the plaintiff, James Lee Sanders, prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Kristin S.
Ahlstrom, was negligent.
ANSWER:
2.
question:

^es

If you answered question 1 "Yes", then answer this
Did James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that such negligence on the part of Kristin S. Ahlstrom
was a proximate cause of the accident?
ANSWER: fa
3.

If you answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes", then answer

this question:

Did James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that his injuries, if any, were proximately caused
by the accident in question^
ANSWER:
4.

//& .

If you answered questions 1, 2 and 3 "Yes", then

answer this question:

What amount of money, if any, did plain-

tiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence he is entitled to
recover from defendant?
Medical Expenses to date

$

Loss of Earnings to date

$

General Damages

$

TOTAL

$

Dated t h i s 30

day of

/TUtf

, 1984.

F(preman o r / f y r e l a d y
-2-

o.VQ
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Lake Ccunty, Utah

OCT 1 5 1984

ROBERT A. BURTON, #0516'
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Build
Salt Lake City, Utah 84
Telephone: 532-7080

H DixorkHinGito. Clerk org Dist Cr-t"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
8

™TB 0F_UTAH

JAMES LEE SANDERS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

JB/. /?/

V

Q .

3*7*,

)
)
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.

)

KRISTIN S. AHLSTROM,

)

Civil No. C83-692
Honorable Leonard Russon
Defendant.

)

The complaint of James Lee Sanders came on for trial
before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, one of the judges of
the above-entitled court, sitting with a jury, on August 2 8,
1984.

Plaintiff, James Lee Sanders, was represented by his

attorney, Samuel King.

Defendant, Kristin S. Ahlstrom, was

represented by her attorney, Robert A. Burton.

At the close of

the evidence, the case was submitted to the jury on a Special
Verdict.

The jury answered the special interrogatories as

follows:
1.

Did the plaintiff, James Lee Sanders, prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant,
Kristin S. Ahlstrom, was negligent.
ANSWER:

Yes

308

2.

If you answered question 1 "Yes", then answer this

question:

Did James Lee Sanders prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that such negligence on the part of
Kristin S. Ahlstrom was a proximate cause of the
accident?
ANSWER:
3.

Yes

If you answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes", then

answer this question:

Did James Lee Sanders prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that his injuries, if
any, were proximately caused by the accident in question?
ANSWER:
4.

No

If you answered questions 1, 2 and 3 "Yes", then

answer this question:

What amount of money, if any,

did plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence
he is entitled to recover from defendant?
Medical Expenses to date

$

Loss of Earnings to date

$

General Damages

$

TOTAL

$
/s/ Rick L. Jeppesen
Foreperson

NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the jury's answers to
the special interrogatories as set forth above, the court orders
and directs judgment in favor of defendant, Kristin S. Ahlstrom,

309

and against plaintiff, James Lee Sanders, no cause of action,
and awards defendant Ahlstrom costs of court incurred herein.
Dated this

/ ^ 5 d a y of odpLumi^.'rv 1984.
BY THE COURT:

Leonard H. Russetf,* Judge

ATTEST
H. DIXON HiN'O'-L'Y
CiCCK

By

—~

Deputy i15iu. *

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni, Attorneys
for

Defendant

herein; that she served the attached

proposed JiKlgment on Special Verdict

u p o n p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Samuel King
Attorney for Plaintiff
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg.
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid thereon,

in*in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the^a^fe

01

day of

. 198 4.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

12th day of

September

198 4
7

My commission expires:
5/13/85

^ N o Notary
t a r y Pi
Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Sal! Lake Ccunty. Utah

OCT 22 1984

ROBERT A. BURTON, #0516
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080

H Dixcn Hir£!ev. C'c

By Z&l '

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES LEE SANDERS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.

Civil No. C83-692

KRISTIN S. AHLSTROM,

Honorable Leonard Russon

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or Modification of Verdict
came on for hearing before the Honorable Leonard Russon, one of
the judges of the above-entitled court, on October 15, 1984.
Plaintiff was represented by his attorney, Samuel King, and
defendant was represented by her attorney, Robert Burton.

The

court having reviewed the memoranda, listened to oral argument,
being fully advised, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's
Motion for New Trial or Modification of Verdict be and hereby
is denied.

Dated this £}_

s

day of October, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON H W rCSi-u
-l •
- ) >iA

{/

n ^ U i ^ ^

JS-^r^ayiJ'
sca*i£nr\
£*fi6onard Russon<^Juc%e

r-e-fi *;

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

PATSY WYATT, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Strong & Hanni, Attorneys
for

Defendant

herein; that she served the attached

upon

Plaintiff's

Order

counsel

by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Samuel King
Attorney for Plaintiff
301 Gymp & Ayers Building
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid thereon,
in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the T 7^^ day of
October

, 198 4.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this I7th

day of

October

198 4.

My commission expires:
5/13/85

/
Notarv Public
Notary
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
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APPENDIX 4

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight or convincing force of their testimony.
In so judging, you can take into consideration any interest a
witness may have in the lawsuit and any bias or probable motive,
or lack thereof, to testify as they do, if any is shown.

You

may also consider the deportment of witnesses upon the witness
stand, the reasonableness or lack thereof of their statements,
their frankness or the want of it, their opportunity to know,
their ability to understand, their capacity to remember, and
whether any witness contradicted himself or herself, and then
determine therefrom, in accordance with your honest convictions,
what weight and credibility you should give to the testimony of
each witness, measured by reason and common sense and the rules
set forth in these instructions.
If you believe a witness has wilfully testified falsely
to any material matter in this case, you may disregard the whole
of the testimony of such witness except as you find it to have
been corroborated by other credible evidence, in which event you
should then give it the weight to which you find it is entitled.

231

APPENDIX 5

INSTRUCTION NO.

(P

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the
opinion of a witness to be received as evidence.

An exception to

this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses•

A person who

by education, study and experience has become an expert in any
art, science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may
give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and
which is material to the case. You should consider such expert
opinion and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You
are not bound, however, by such an opinion.

Give it the weight

to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight,
and you may reject it, if in your judgment the reasons given for
it are unsound.

APPENDIX 6

INSTRUCTION NO.

7

As jurors, it is your exclusive responsibility to determine the issues of fact in this case, and you are to decide
those issues from the evidence received in the trial and not
from speculation or conjecture.
The evidence to be considered by you includes the testimony of witnesses, exhibits received by the court, stipulations
of the parties, if any, reasonable inferences to be drawn from
facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as are stated in
these instructions, and all of the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby.
If and where there is a conflict in the evidence, you
should reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can; but
where the conflict cannot be reconciled then, since you are the
final judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses,
you must resolve that conflict and determine from the evidence
what you believe the true facts to be.
Statements of counsel made throught the trial are not evidence and should not be considered as such by you.

APPENDIX 7

INSTRUCTION NO.

(^

If you believe any witness or any party has wilfully
testified falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard
the entire testimony of such witness or party, except as he may
have been corroborated by other credible evidence.

